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Richard F. Hassing, Cartesian Psychophysics and the Whole Nature of Man: On Descartes’s Passions of 
the Soul, London: Lexington Books, 2015, xvi + 229 pp.
There is an underlying theme of reunification running through Hassing’s Cartesian Psychophysics 
and the Whole Nature of Man. Part of it is right there in the title—this is a book about Descartes 
and ‘psychophysics’; it’s about Descartes and the whole nature of man. Those are fighting words 
in the context of a certain, canonical picture of Descartes, in which his primary achievement is 
taken to be the metaphysical splitting of the mind from the body—and in which he is seen as 
something like the father of modern scientific reductionism, for whom everything should be 
dealt  with in terms of singular essences,  and should be explained through the most minimal 
units.  The  Descartes  in  that  picture  enforces  a  radical  separation  between  the  psyche  and 
physics. He deals with humans either as minds or as bodies, and clumsily avoids accounting for 
the union of the two. Arguably, the most traditional image of Descartes depicts him as avoiding 
the physical side altogether: for that Descartes, humans, to all intents and purposes, just are their 
souls, and their bodies are little more than error-producing encumbrances that can, and should, 
be happily ignored. So, when, at the end of the letter-preface to his Passions of the Soul, Descartes 
states  that  his  aim  in  the  treatise  is  to  explain  the  passions  not  as  an  orator  or  a  moral 
philosopher  but  only  as  a  physicist,  it  might  look  as  though  he  is  compartmentalising  his 
approach—as though he is dealing with something purely physical, cordoned off from the issues 
of rhetoric and morals (in a wide sense) that, presumably, pertain to the domain of the mind. 
Initially,  this  also  looks  like  the  direction  that  Hassing  is  taking  here,  when  he  brings  up 
Descartes’s ‘only as physicist’ comment at the start of his own preface, and then again in his 
introduction. Hassing claims that Cartesian Psychophysics addresses the Cartesian conception of 
the self not in the traditional way, through the metaphysics of the Meditations, but ‘from a less 
common perspective,  that  of  natural  philosophy’  (p.  1),  and then goes on to provide a  brief 
overview of  Descartes’s  physics.  Specialists  might  bristle  a  bit  at  this—addressing  Descartes 
through his physics is not so uncommon anymore, after a good thirty years, at least, of prolonged 
scholarship on the topic. But Hassing is not aiming this book primarily at specialists, I think, 
and, in the wider world, the old image of Descartes, as the quintessential metaphysician of mind 
and rational epistemologist, still has teeth. But both Hassing’s preface and introduction—and, 
for that matter, the book as a whole—move quickly from physics, and the physiology of the 
passions,  to  philosophy  of  action,  ethics,  and  politics—and  it  becomes  very  clear  just  how 
integrationist his approach is.
Speaking of the Passions of the Soul, it’s worth noting that this is ostensibly a study of that book. 
The subtitle—literally, On Descartes’s Passions of the Soul—states as much. But it is more than a 
commentary on a single treatise; there is some reunification going on here too. This is a fairly 
short book (unlike, say, Denis Kambouchner’s roughly 1,000-page, two volume treatment of the 
Passions),  but  it  still  finds  space  to  dedicate  its  first  four  chapters  to,  first,  the  Scholastic 
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background, and then to the ‘prerequisite[s] for’ (p. 29) what Hassing takes to be at stake in the 
Passions, in, respectively, the Treatise on Man, the Meditations, and the Discourse. His interest here is 
in what the self becomes, for Descartes, following the rejection of the Aristotelian conception of 
the soul. Accordingly, he starts off, in Chapter 1, by outlining what it is that Descartes rejects—in 
particular, the premodern stratification of the self in terms of different souls or soul-parts, and, 
consequently, the central role of that stratification in ethics and politics. Since Descartes splits 
the  responsibilities  of  the  various  Aristotelian  souls  between  two  utterly  separate  kinds  of 
substance (body and mind), Hassing argues, he is going to need some way for (mind-based) will 
and reason to influence bodily activity, in order for anything like an ethics to be possible. On 
Hassing’s account, Descartes’s solution lies in his identification of the pineal gland as the seat of 
the mind in the body.
Like Descartes himself, Hassing focuses on the physiological and practical implications of the 
union of mind and body—both of them are interested here in what it is, if ours minds really are 
connected  to  our  bodies  at  the  pineal  gland,  to  be  a  human  being,  to  have  passions  and 
sensations as a human being, and, most importantly, to act as a human being. The metaphysics of 
how such a connection might actually work is, on Hassing’s reading, somewhat beside the point 
for  Descartes;  what  matters  are  the  consequences  for  human  action.  The  rest  of  Cartesian 
Psychophysics  sets  about  examining  those  consequences.  Hassing  dedicates  most  space  to  the 
physiological side—that is, to the issues of how a body works when it is connected to a mind 
through its pineal gland, and how a mind is affected by that connection. This is because he takes 
the  physiology  of  the  Cartesian  (united)  self  to  ground  its  action—at  least  insofar  as  the 
physiology provides the framework in which human action takes place.
The fundamentals of this physiology get set out in Chapter 2, through a brief analysis of the 
Treatise on Man, in terms of what Hassing calls ‘Descartes’s inertial principle’, by which he means, 
‘a distinctive mechanism of inertially persistent connections in the temporal development of the 
human brain and its conjoined soul’ (p. 37). In Chapter 3, he goes on to on interpret Descartes’s 
discussion of the ‘teachings of nature’ in Meditation 6 in light of this inertial principle, showing 
how it shapes the experience of being human, how it gives us a natural teleology (the health of 
the union), and how it accounts for epistemic error. Chapter 4 then takes a slightly different tack 
and addresses the relationship between the mind, the body, and language in Discourse 5. In some 
broad sense, this latter seems to be the reintegration of the orator that Descartes set aside in the 
preface to the Passions—at least, the traditional relevance of the passions for rhetoric, amongst 
other aspects of language, gets incorporated back into Descartes’s psychophysical account. As 
Hassing puts it, ‘there is a close connections between human passion and human speech [. . .]. 
This is one, very obvious sense of the Aristotelian definition of human being as political animal 
possessing speech [. . .],  namely,  a lot of speech is impassioned—political  speech especially 
so’ (p. 64).
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With these prerequisites covered, chapters 5–10 work their way through the Passions. The treatise 
itself is broken up into a series of slightly over two hundred short articles, and, for the most part, 
Hassing deals with them stepwise, either individually or in small groups. This structural choice, 
in itself,  makes the book a useful resource for anyone interested in Descartes’s  Passions—and 
while Hassing’s reading and emphases are in line with his own focus on the self, there is plenty 
here for a more general audience. This extended reading of the Passions ends up, as it probably 
must, in a treatment of Descartes’s conception of generosity (Chapter 10). Out of everything in 
Descartes’s work, it is in generosity that the passions and something like an ethics really come 
together. Cartesian generosity is an individual’s awareness of having complete control over their 
own volitions and complete responsibility for how they use that control,  combined with the 
constant  resolve  to  use  it  virtuously.  Generosity,  then,  on  Hassing’s  reading,  is  the  most 
developed state of the mind’s relation to the body—it is the ideal endpoint of psychophysical 
development.
The  final  chapter  before  the  conclusion  is  a  short  diversion  into  Descartes’s  treatment  of 
heaviness. Descartes rejects the Scholastic conception of heaviness, or gravitas, as a real quality—
as something in the object itself that pulls it downwards. He takes this to be an error that comes 
from confusing the way our own minds operate on our bodies with the way bodies operate on 
each other. Hassing addresses this partly as a particularly apt example of how our psychophysical 
self influences our thoughts, for Descartes, and of how self and thoughts can be emended (in this 
case, by coming to an understanding of heaviness in terms of extension alone). But he also, I 
suspect, inserts this chapter to come back to physics—this time, from the top down, as it were. 
In the preface, he says that the book is the result of his ‘lifelong interest in two things: physics 
and  political  pathologies’  (p.  xi).  Throughout,  he  has  been  using  physics  (in  the  form  of 
physiology) to be able to talk about practical philosophy; here, at the end, he uses what amounts 
to philosophy of action to talk about basic physics—to talk about gravity. It’s somehow fitting, 
then,  that,  by  the  end  of  the  chapter,  this  discussion  of  physics  turns  into  a  discussion  of 
Descartes’s treatment of the passion of love.
Although, throughout the book, Hassing concentrates mainly on the psychophysics of its title, 
the practical—and especially the political—side of the Cartesian self is rarely far removed from 
his account. An analysis of articles 18 (‘The will’) and 20 (‘Imaginings and other thoughts formed 
by the soul’)  in the Passions,  for example, brings up the assassination of Henry IV of France, 
alongside the Dutch War of Independence, and quotes both Henry Kissinger and Osama Bin 
Laden  (pp.  89–93).  This  is  the  major,  overriding  reunification  at  work  in  the  book:  the 
reunification of physics with politics, of physiology with practical philosophy, with epistemology, 
with  (although  more  implicitly)  metaphysics,  and  so  on.  In  Cartesian  terms,  this  is  the 
reunification of a tree of knowledge that modernity has tended to compartmentalise. Hassing 
refuses to treat any of his subjects in isolation, presenting an image of Descartes in which (at the 
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very least) politics, ethics, philosophy of action, psychology, physiology, physics, and metaphysics 
coincide with each other, and are inextricable from each other.
This  brings  me to  the final  kind of  reunification I  want  to  mention here:  that  of  past  and 
present. Hassing is explicit that what he is giving is a ‘post-9/11 interpretation of The Passions of the 
Soul’ (p. xii). Specifically, he thinks that reading Descartes in the context of present-day religious 
extremism  brings  out  previously  hidden  elements  in  Descartes’s  thought—and  that  those 
elements might tell us something about how religious extremism works and how, at least on an 
individual level, it might be overcome. This is where he takes Descartes’s concept of generosity. 
Hassing argues that radical individual responsibility is at the heart of Cartesian generosity, and 
that this prevents individuals from acting for the sake of wider, depersonalised groups, such as a 
religion—he calls this ‘the depoliticization or [. . .] de-religionization of thumos—or, equivalently, 
[. . .] the athumetization of religion and politics’ (p. 172). This integration of history and the 
present—and its being done through politics—gives the book a compelling urgency, and it’s good 
to see history being put to work in this way. On the other hand, in many very real ways, it no 
longer seems entirely appropriate to think of our current context as ‘post-9/11’;  the religious 
extremism  that  is  Hassing’s  focus  now  seems  like  a  much  smaller  part  of  an  even  more 
complicated political situation. Of course, this book was published in 2015, and a lot has changed 
in the last couple of years. It would be interesting to see what resources Hassing could find in 
Descartes for addressing a world of Trump and of the UK’s departure from the European Union; 
I’d worry that the individualism and localism he sees in Cartesian generosity could be more of a 
contributor than corrective to the political pathologies at work here. This is not a criticism of 
Hassing, though—it’s a continuation of the approach in a rich, dynamic book that refuses to 
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